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IV. Aesthetic Experience Rediscovered  
 
The idea of aesthetic experience did not fare well in the second half of the 20
th
 
century. Adorno and his disciples, clad in black, despised indulgence without 
reflection. A primarily non-intellectual reception was liable to lead into the snares of 
ideology. Under the influence of Adorno,
2
 a generation of intellectuals, at least in 
Europe, tried hard not to be carried away by catchy tunes and felt guilty for 
identifying with James Bond in the movie theater. Art’s title to truth, a debt inherited 
from Hegel, led to a ban on the senses. Perhaps even more than Critical Theory, 
poststructuralism contributed to the disregard for aesthetic experience. The very idea 
of experience was shunned by a philosophy that replaced subjects with discourses and 
dissolved presence into traces: ‘As to the concept of experience, it is very unfortunate 
here... it belongs to the history of metaphysics and we can only use it under erasure.’3 
Even Barthes’ concept of jouissance, the voluptuous reading, refuses the reader an 
immersion in the fictive universe and instead aims at her masochistic disfiguration in 
plays of signification. In the Anglo-American tradition, Dewey’s heritage dwindled 
soon.
4
 The notion of aesthetic experience became more and more confined in the 
course of the controversy between Beardsley and Dickie.
5
 In major analytical theories 
of art, it played no role. While aesthetic experience has no place in Goodman’s 
semiological agenda, Danto denies it relevance to the definition of (modern) art.
6
 
Surely, there were dissenting voices: Launching an invective against the 
anemia of contemporary criticism, Susan Sontag fervently pleaded for an erotics of 
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reading.
7
 In France, Mikel Dufrenne developed a phenomenological model of 
aesthetics while the German writer Karl Heinz Bohrer, tapping into the heritage of 
Romanticism and walking on Ernst Jünger’s ‘blutbetaute Wiesen’, elaborated on 
suddenness and violence as salient traits of the aesthetic experience.
8
 That being said, 
such endeavors remained somehow marginal; the sway of the linguistic turn was too 
powerful. Only the last two decades have seen a reemergence of experience as a key 
concept of aesthetics. One of the most emphatic advocates of this shift is Hans Ulrich 
Gumbrecht. In his efforts to establish the idea of presence as an alternative to the 
paradigm of meaning, aesthetic experience figures prominently, as it is conceived ‘as 
an oscillation (and sometimes as an interference) between ‘presence effects’ and 
‘meaning effects’.’9 Trying to venture beyond the exclusive realm of aesthetic 
autonomy, Gumbrecht argues ‘that we all feel how multiple modalities of aesthetic 
experience permeate our everyday worlds today (without becoming a part of or 
identical with the everyday)’.10  
The thrust of Gumbrecht’s mission is shared by the works of a couple of 
philosophers.
11
 Dieter Mersch, for example, sets out to redefine art as performance.
12
 
He uses Benjamin’s concept of aura as a frame for aesthetic experience which is not 
so much about significance as the simple fact of appearance and material presence. 
From this perspective, the emphasis of 20
th
-century art on abstraction and action is not 
a probing of the limits of art but a manifestation of its core. Appearance is also the 
central term of Martin Seel’s aesthetics:13 art hinges on aesthetic experience which is 
directed towards appearances for the sake of appearance. While not denying the 
cognitive elements of aesthetic experience, Seel homes in on its sensual aspect. 
Even in analytical philosophy with its much narrower concept of aesthetic 
experience, often confined to epistemic aspects, a new interest seems to have 
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emerged. Richard Shusterman, for one, understands the decline of the concept of 
aesthetic experience as the consequence of deep conceptual confusion.
14
 A 
redemption of the idea of aesthetic experience seems not only possible, but, in the 
light of current developments, also highly desirable. While Shusterman finds 
inspiration in Dewey’s broad notion of aesthetic experience, Noël Carroll makes a 
case for a deflationary, content-orientated, enumerative approach. For him, all that 
can be said about aesthetic experience is that it ‘involves design appreciation and/or 
the detection of aesthetic and expressive properties and/or attention to the ways in 
which the formal, aesthetic, and expressive properties of artwork are contrived’15. As 
minimalist, if not to say truncated, as this definition is, it illustrates a re-awakened 
interest in experience also in Anglo-American aesthetics. Still without a lemma of its 
own in the four volumes of the Encyclopedia of Aesthetics published in 1998, 
aesthetic experience has an article for itself in the single-volumed Oxford Handbook 
of Aesthetics from 2003. 
In pointing to ‘a cultural environment that makes us fear we have lost touch 
with the materiality of things’16, Gumbrecht provides a possible answer to the 
question as to why experience currently attracts so much attention in aesthetic theory. 
Besides being a powerful tool against the linguistic turn, the notion of experience also 
lends itself to securing the ground that seems to be endangered by virtual realities. 
Aesthetic experience is however not specifically the product of our current cultural 
environment. The anxiety of being disconnected from the ‘real’ world just draws our 
attention to the experiential dimension of our responses to art as well as of being in 
the world in general. Ancient aesthetics drive home that the immersive capacity of art 
is not a new phenomenon. A series of recent monographs demonstrate that the strong 
appeal of art looms large in ancient treatises.
17
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Plato is an unexpected case in point. He is usually considered, in the words of 
Nietzsche, ‘the greatest enemy of the arts to rise from Europe so far’18, but his 
engagement with art is far more complex than this label has it.
19
 In Plato’s Republic, 
Socrates not only pushes for banning art from the ideal state, but also speaks of it in 
terms of a former mistress that has not lost her allure yet (607b–608b).20 Sontag’s plea 
for an erotics of reading is here encapsulated in a metaphor. It is also important to 
note that Plato’s critical stance is rooted in his sensitivity to the sway of art over its 
recipients. In the Republic, Socrates discusses the capacity of poetry to induce strong 
feelings in us (606a–b): ‘And the best element in our nature, since it is not properly 
educated by reason or habit, relaxes its guard over the mournful part, for it 
contemplates sufferings of others and it is no shame to it to praise and pity another 
who, claiming to be a good man, abandons himself to excess in his grief.’ Plato here 
has Socrates allude to a famous sentence in Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen: (11.9 DK): 
‘Into those who hear it comes fearful fright and tearful pity and mournful longing, and 
at the successes and failures of others’ affairs and persons the mind suffers, through 
the words, a suffering of its own.’ However, Socrates condemns what Gorgias hails as 
evidence of brilliance: poetry exposes us to feelings that we otherwise try to repress. 
Nonetheless, Plato is highly aware of the strong physical and psychological reactions 
that poetry can elicit from us. Seen in the light of the current debate in aesthetics, 
Plato appears less as an enemy of the Muses than as a careful, if critical observer of 
dimensions of aesthetic experience of which Adorno, Derrida & Co lost track. 
In this essay, I wish to show that ancient authors provide fascinating material 
for the current discussion on aesthetic experience. Their emphasis on the immersive 
power of art can stimulate an aesthetic theory that tries to recover from the diet 
prescribed by poststructuralism, Critical Theory and the mainstream of analytical 
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philosophy. Needless to say, the meditations of ancient authors do not fully map onto 
our current debate. This is the very chasm that allows ancient texts to cast light on 
present concerns. Here I will concentrate on reflections on narrative.
21
 It is striking 
that the philosophers mentioned above tend to focus on visual arts, be it the traditional 
tableau, installations or performances. Narrative is, if mentioned at all, rarely 
considered. While arguing for a radical extension in range of the objects of aesthetic 
experience, Gumbrecht shares the general disdain for narrative. In an article 
discussing the possibility of achieving presence in language, he notes ‘that language 
can produce epiphanies in which the past is made present’22. However, ‘this... evokes 
exceptional situations and achievements that have to be wrested, so to speak, from, 
and even against the grain of, the (for us) normal functioning of language.’ 
Gumbrecht juxtaposes ‘an analogical way of using language (presentifaction)’ with ‘a 
digital one (narrative or description)’. Accordingly, In 1926. Living at the Edge of 
Time offers a non-narrative account in order to make the past present.
23
 Given that the 
new interest in aesthetic experience is a move against the linguistic turn, the 
inclination to bypass narrative is not surprising. And yet, the testimony of ancient 
texts can alert us to the fact that narrative is not only a means of representation (as 
opposed to presence), but that it also has the capacity to trigger experiences in its 
recipients.
24
 
The power of words looms large in ancient theoreticians, ranging from 
Aristotle, who elaborates on pity and fear as our response to tragedy, to Longinus and 
his obsession with the sublime: the rhetorical phantasia ‘not only persuades, but 
enslaves the listener’ ([Longin.] Subl. 15.9). I will however forgo the easy harvest 
from theoretical treatises and instead consider meta-narrative, that is the reflections 
embedded in narratives themselves. The reason for this shift of focus is the additional 
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complexity of meta-narrative that has reflection grind against narrative: being 
concomitant with the generation of aesthetic experience, its reflection becomes more 
dynamic. My first illustrating example comes from the beginning of ancient Greek 
literature, from the Odyssey (II); the second features in a text that stands near its end, 
the novel Ethiopica (III). The temporal gap and difference between prose and poetry 
notwithstanding, both Homer and Heliodorus piercingly reflect on the experiences 
narrative is able to trigger. But is it legitimate to relate ancient positions to our 
contemporary discussion? Are not art and aesthetics inventions of the Enlightenment 
period? How can therefore ancient texts shed light on them? A final section tackles 
this tricky issue and sketches an approach that tries to mediate between the caveats of 
historical semantics and the transhistorical claims of phenomenology (IV). 
 
II. The Tears of Odysseus 
 
The meta-narrative character of the Odyssey is striking: Numerous tales and 
songs mirror the epic in which they are embedded.
25
 The audiences in the Odyssey 
prefigure the recipients of the Odyssey. Sometimes the responses of the internal 
audience anticipate that of the external audience, sometimes they contrast; in any 
case, they cast light on each other. Particularly salient is the recital of three songs by 
the bard Demodocus at the court of Alcinous, the king of the Phaeacians. While the 
middle song is a burlesque account of infidelity among gods, the first and third songs 
deal with the Trojan War, more specifically with events in which Odysseus starred 
prominently: a quarrel between him and Agamemnon and the ruse of the wooden 
horse. Both stories touch Odysseus so much that he veils his head and cries. A simile 
underscores the intensity of his feelings (8.523–31, tr. Lattimore):   
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As a woman weeps, when she falls on her dear husband, 
 who’s fallen in front of his city and people, 
 warding off ruthless day from his city and children, 
 and as she sees him gasping and dying, she throws her 
 arms around him, and loudly wails, but those behind her 
 strike her back and shoulders with their spears 
 and lead her into bondage, to have hard work and hardship, 
 and her cheeks waste away with the most piteous grief, 
 so Odysseus let piteous tears fall from under his brows. 
 
It is debated how much we should press this remarkable passage.
26
 The simile 
is closely related to the topic of Demodocus’ song: the mourning of the female 
prisoner of war can be read as a sequel to the ruse that allowed the Greeks to enter the 
walls of Troy.
27
 The husband, who falls in front of the city defending his city and 
family, may even evoke more specifically Hector.
28
 In the view of many interpreters, 
the links between simile and Demodocus’ song insinuate that Demodocus’ song puts 
Odysseus into the shoes of his victims: like Achilles and Priam in Iliad 24, Odysseus 
senses the human condition that defines his enemies as well as him. Pointing out that 
Odysseus is only said to cry like the widow, others, including Schopenhauer, suggest 
more cautiously that Odysseus is affected by the contrast between his heroic stature in 
the Trojan War and his more recent ordeals.
29
 For the purposes of my argument, it is 
crucial that the response to a mere recital is compared with the reaction not only to an 
actual event, but to such a profound experience as the death of one’s husband. 
Aesthetic experience is thereby aligned with intense real-life experiences. The 
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comparison gains additional force through a double inversion: a male victor is 
juxtaposed with a female victim. This drives home the defenselessness of Odysseus 
against the emotions instilled in him by the recital.  
Less obvious, but perhaps even more noteworthy is the alignment of 
Odysseus’ listening with the woman’s seeing. Together with the inversion of gender 
and role, the conflation of the senses highlights the intensity of reception experience, 
in particular as sight is generally considered to be more immediate than hearsay in 
ancient Greece.30 More specifically, it adumbrates the rhetorical category of enargeia, 
vividness, that would figure very prominently in critical treatises of the Imperial Age. 
The most salient aspect of enargeia, rooted in the word’s etymology, is visual 
appeal.
31
 It is frequently defined as ‘speech bringing what is being explained before 
the eyes’.32 In encapsulating the concept of enargeia, the simile of the crying widow, 
itself highly visual, bridges the gap between narrative and theory as well as between 
the Archaic and Imperial Ages. 
Odysseus’ tears thus indicate that, far from being predicated on the aloof 
stance of disinterestedness, the reception process is an intense experience that 
involves strong feelings and even a physical reaction. It would be however too easy to 
take Odysseus’ reaction as a smooth mirror for the response of the Odyssey’s 
audience. The Phaeacians indulge in the performance without signs of distress and 
thereby throw into relief the peculiar position of Odysseus. While Plato and Gorgias 
muse on recipients that feel the sufferings of others as their own, Odysseus witnesses 
an account of his own adventures. His position is therefore markedly different from 
that of the Homeric audience. It is equally questionable though to see in the 
Phaeacians a straight model. The life of the Phaeacians reflects aspects of a Golden 
Age just as Scheria is reminiscent of the Island of the Blessed. Alcinous and his 
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people live a life of ease that is a far cry from the world of ordinary heroes and even 
more so with regard to the audience of Homer. Their detachment is sui generis. A 
critic therefore remarks: ‘perhaps Odysseus’s tears more accurately figure the norm 
for Homer’s audience as well as for Aristotle’s’.33 I think it is neither necessary nor 
helpful to choose one against the other. The diverging reactions of Phaeacians and 
Odysseus rather outline a spectrum in which the various responses of Homer’s 
audience can range: somewhere from detached pleasure to strong involvement 
including tears.
34
 Besides illustrating the intensity that aesthetic experience can gain, 
Demodocus’ recital reveals the wide range of possible responses and their dependence 
on the stance of the recipient. 
Both poles of response to narrative come to the fore in other episodes of the 
Odyssey. In book 4, tales about the homecoming of heroes from Troy, including 
Odysseus, make first Telemachus and then also Menelaus, Helen and Peisistratus cry. 
Helen mixes into the wine a drug that, the narrator points out, would prevent 
somebody from crying even if he were to witness the slaying of the closest relatives 
(4.220–6). The drug allows the storytelling to continue without causing grief. As in 
the simile of the crying widow in book 8, the response to song is compared to an 
extremely painful real life experience, but this time to highlight the detachment of the 
recipient. Ancient authors, namely Plutarch and Himerius,
35
 did not hesitate to read 
Helen’s drug allegorically as a cipher for the distancing power of words. Much more 
could be said on Helen’s drug, but for my argument it suffices to note that, if we 
follow the lead of the ancient readers mentioned, its effect crystallizes the distance 
that inheres in aesthetic experience, albeit to a varying extent.
36
 
The other pole of aesthetic experience, that is immersion, is embodied by the 
Sirens. Their song is so enthralling that whoever hears it falls prey to its spell. The 
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bones on the island of the Sirens attest the fate of wanderers who unheroically forgot 
about their nostos. The metapoetic significance of the episode is obvious: ‘enchanting 
by the melody of their singing’ (12.44) and claiming to ‘know everything’ (12.189), 
the Sirens are strongly reminiscent of the Muses into whose fountain the epic poet 
taps. The Sirens’ song has been described as ‘a ghastly imitation of epic’.37 More 
specifically it has been seen as reminiscent of the Iliad while also evoking lyric 
poetry.
38
 For my interpretation, it is crucial that the song of the Sirens is uncannily 
beautiful: it provokes an aesthetic experience that, being more intense than real life 
experience, has the capacity to replace it. Art threatens to extinguish life. Only the 
chain binding Odysseus to the mast allows him to keep the distance that prevents full 
immersion. 
It is emblematic that Adorno and Horkheimer read the Siren episode as a 
parable of class struggle. Odysseus as landlord is opposed to the rowing comrades 
who figure as the workers. The Siren episode intimates that the bourgeois indulgence 
in art hinges on the exploitation of labour: ‘In this way the enjoyment of art and 
manual work diverge as the primeval world is left behind. The epic already contains 
the correct theory. Between the cultural heritage and enforced work here is a precise 
correlation, and both are founded on the inescapable compulsion toward the social 
control of nature’39 The interpretation of the Odyssey in the Dialektik der Aufklärung 
is a standout highlight in the long history of Homeric exegesis, and yet in its one-
sidedness it illustrates the shortcomings of Critical Aesthetics. A philosophy that sees 
art only in its relation to ideology has to miss the profound reflection on the abyss of 
aesthetic experience inherent in the Siren episode. 
It would be easy to give further passages from the Odyssey that can be read as 
meditations on aesthetic experience, but the examples adduced already show the 
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complexity of its reflection. The Odyssey highlights the experiential character of 
responses to narrative that has not only been downplayed by adherents of 
poststructuralism and Critical Theory, but is also ignored in more recent works 
rediscovering the idea of aesthetic experience: narrative is more than a means of 
representation; the strong reactions it can provoke drive home its capacity to create 
presence. While underscoring the immersive appeal of narrative, the Odyssey does 
not fail to note the distance constitutive of aesthetic experience. The interaction 
between reflection on narrative and narrative itself adds to the complexity of these 
reflections. The response of the recipients of the Odyssey does not simply map onto 
the reactions of the listeners in the Odyssey. The two audiences are rather hinged 
together in a way that lets them grind against each other. Sometimes the external 
audience smoothly continues the reaction of the internal audience; sometimes it rubs 
against it. The simultaneous generation of, and reflection on, aesthetic experience 
gives meta-narrative an additional twist and makes it more intriguing than theoretical 
treatises. 
 
III. Reflection and Immersion in Heliodorus 
 
Turning from Homer to Heliodorus, we move to a very different cultural 
setting. While the Odyssey is the product of a long oral tradition that is likely to have 
been recited first mainly at public festivals, the Ethiopica, the romance of Charicleia 
and Theagenes, were written sometime in the 3
rd
 or 4
th
 century CE and belong to the 
flourishing literary culture of the Second Sophistic. These differences 
notwithstanding, Heliodorus’ novel, besides capitalizing on the Odyssey as intertext, 
continues its reflections on aesthetic experience.
40
 Nowadays studied only by a small 
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group of experts, the Ethiopica, after being translated into the vernacular languages, 
was a key text for both early modern poetics and the rise of the modern novel. 
Scaliger, for example, one of the most prominent scholars of the 16
th
 century, wrote: 
‘I believe that the epic poet should read this book very carefully and regard it as the 
very best model.’41 In addition to the poet Spenser, Sidney and the first writers of 
French romance, the author of Arcadia, Cervantes, was influenced by the narrative art 
of Heliodorus.
42
 The Ethiopica, ‘the ancient world’s summa, a self-consciously 
encyclopaedic synthesis of a thousand years of accumulated pagan plot techniques’43, 
brilliantly entwines multiple plot strands and nests up to four levels of narrative. Its 
treatment of narrative and narrated time is breathtaking: it takes the reader five books, 
half of the novel, to grasp the prehistory and fully understand the initial scene. Even 
readers that have feasted on such labyrinthian movies such as Memento will be 
splendidly entertained by Heliodorus. 
Similarly to the Odyssey, inset tales endow the Ethiopica with a strong meta-
narrative level. The longest of these narrations fills most of the novel’s first half: the 
sly Egyptian Calasiris tells an Athenian named Cnemon how Charicleia and 
Theagenes fell in love and came to Egypt. Cnemon’s responses that from time to time 
punctuate the embedded narrative reveal how fully he is enwrapped in its plot. His 
immersion has been interpreted along different lines. In a seminal paper that explores 
the meta-narrative significance of the Ethiopica, Jack Winkler argues that ‘it is 
Knemon’s special failing to respond to literature as if it were life... He cannot sustain 
the critical distance which drama and novels require as representations of reality.’44 
Drawing on Barthes’ distinction between the ‘readerly’ and ‘writerly’ modes of 
reception, Winkler condemns Cnemon as ‘lector non scrupulosus’ who illustrates how 
the Ethiopica ought not to be read. Readers are not supposed to identify with 
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characters and immerse themselves in the world of the action, but ought to analyze 
soberly the play with signification in all its ramifications. Other scholars though 
disagree with Winkler and read Cnemon’s immersion as a positive model for the 
reader of the Ethiopica: ‘Knemon presents an exact fit, cognitively and affectively, 
with the reader.’45 This take on Cnemon is better attuned to the sensitivities of ancient 
readers for whom a strong involvement of recipients signals the high quality of a text. 
The prominence of enargeia in rhetorical and critical treatises illustrates the high 
esteem enjoyed by immersive narrative particularly in the Second Sophistic. That 
being said, I would like to discuss an exemplary passage to show that either 
interpretation is too simple. Cnemon’s responses highlight not only the spell narrative 
can cast over its audience, but illustrate the intricate relation between immersion and 
reflection and thereby let us see a central tenet of poststructuralism in a new light.  
Calasiris, the paternal friend of Charicleia and Theagenes, offers his narration 
of their adventures in exchange for Cnemon’s promise that the couple will join them 
very soon. Narrating how Charicleia and Theagenes met in Delphi, Calasiris lavishly 
elaborates on their dashing appearance at a procession – and is interrupted by Cnemon 
(3.4):
46
 
 
‘It’s them!’ exclaimed Cnemon. ‘It’s Charicleia and Theagenes!’ ‘Where are 
 they? In the gods’ name, show me!’ implored Calasiris, supposing that 
 Cnemon could actually see them. ‘Father, I believed I saw them, although 
 they are not here. So vividly did your description show them as I know them 
 from my own experience.’ ‘I doubt’, said Calasiris, ‘that you have seen them 
as Greece and the sun gazed upon them that day, universally admired,  
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universally acclaimed. Men lost their hearts to Charicleia, and women theirs to 
 Theagenes. To know the love of one of them, people thought, must be like 
 immortality, although the locals admired more the young man, and the 
 Thessalians the maid, each being more struck by what they were seeing for the 
 first time. For an unfamiliar sight is generally more impressive than one well 
 known to us.’ ‘Such a sweet deception, such a sweet belief, how you furnished 
 me with wings, when I thought you could see and show the beloved. But it 
 seems that you have been deceiving me all along, because at the beginning of 
 my story you gave me your word that they were on their way and would 
 appear any second – and, what is more, you demanded payment in the form of 
 their history. Now it is evening and night, and still you cannot show them.’ 
 
One could not wish for a better illustration of enargeia: Calasiris’ account lets 
Cnemon visualize the procession. Cnemon even uses the adjective of the technical 
term enargeia to praise the vividness of the presentation. That being said, the passage 
underscores that aesthetic experience hinges on reflection as well as immersion. As a 
critic notes, ‘it is not Knemon, but Kalasiris who is deluded’.47 Aesthetic illusion is 
thus thrown into relief by real delusion. While Calasiris expects that Charicleia and 
Theagenes are actually coming around the corner, Cnemon, as absorbed as he is, is 
facing Calasiris and aware that he is following a narration. A vivid account may move 
us to visualize a scene, but it is distinct from the mistaken belief that something 
absent is actually present. The juxtaposition with actual delusion underlines that 
aesthetic illusion is a ‘willing suspension of disbelief’. 
Calasiris’s additional comment can be read as a qualification of the power of 
imagination. He obviously doubts that Cnemon has seen Charicleia and Theagenes in 
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the splendor with which they were endowed during the procession. His words though 
permit a reading along different lines: If we refer ‘you have seen’ to what Cnemon 
‘believes’ that he ‘saw’ during the narration, the capacity of his imagination to 
reproduce the scene mentally is challenged. What is primarily a trope to highlight the 
extraordinariness of the scene implies a comment on the limits of aesthetic illusion: 
no matter how strong the spell cast by a tale is, the recipient will fail to envision the 
scene fully as it happened. 
The neat juxtaposition of aesthetic illusion with delusion is subtly blurred. 
Heliodorus semantically mitigates the contrast: Cnemon ‘believed (ôiêthên) I saw 
them, although they are not here’ and Calasiris invokes his ‘sweet belief (oiêseôs)’. 
The deployment of the same words blends together not only aesthetic illusion and 
delusion, but also narrative and reality: Calasiris reminds Cnemon of his promise and 
asks him to ‘show’ (deiknye) him Charicleia and Theagenes, using the verb two more 
times in the same sense (deiknynai).
48
 Strikingly, Cnemon applies a compound form 
of the same verb to narrative: ‘So vividly did your description show (hypedeixen) 
them as I know them from my own experience.’ While the use of the same stem 
undercuts the dichotomy of narrative deixis and actual showing, the prefix hypo- , 
often adding a quantum of obliqueness, insinuates a distinction that cannot be erased. 
Calasiris invokes ‘sweet deception’ (ô tês hêdeias apatês) and accuses 
Cnemon of deceiving him (exapatan). He feels cheated because Cnemon has failed to 
produce the couple, as he had promised to do in exchange for his tale. That being said, 
the adjective ‘sweet’, which qualifies ‘deception’, suggests understanding it also 
aesthetically. As a famous Gorgias fragment illustrates (B 23 DK), apatê has a long-
standing history as a terminus for aesthetic experience: Tragedy is named as a genre 
that provides its audience with ‘a deception in which the one who succeeds in 
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deceiving, rather than the one who fails to do so, has right on his side, and in which 
the deceived is wiser than the undeceived.’ In the Imperial era, another highly 
reflective text, the younger Philostratus’ Imagines, features the very phrase ‘sweet 
deception’ (hêdeia apatê, proem 4) applied to the power of a picture.49 The use of 
vocabulary apt for aesthetic experience implicitly aligns Calasiris’ delusion with 
Cnemon’s absorption.  
As these observations show, the scene does not simply illustrate enargeia as 
the capacity of narrative to conjure up a scenery before the inner eye of the audience; 
its reflection is considerably more nuanced. The response of Calasiris to Cnemon’s 
interruption offsets aesthetic experience against delusion. While reverberations subtly 
challenge a clear-cut dichotomy between narration and deception, Heliodorus is far 
from propagating a mimeticism that eradicates the boundary between fiction and 
reality. On the contrary, the scintillating play that Heliodorus sets up requires the 
distinction.  
The passage gains a further twist if we relate the intervention of Cnemon to 
the response of Heliodorus’ reader. Paradoxically, Cnemon’s exclamation that 
expresses his absorption goes against the immersion of the readers as it draws their 
attention to the mediation of the story: far from directly witnessing the procession, 
they follow Calasiris’ account in a novel by Heliodorus. Perhaps, the relation between 
immersion and reflection is even more intricate. The reader is alerted to the mediation 
of the embedded tale, but the focus on the embedding story, that is Calasiris’ 
conversation with Cnemon, as frame of the embedded story can heighten the 
immersion in the primary narrative. Our response to the plot is of course always 
accompanied by a residual awareness of the fact that we are only reading a novel, but 
envisaging the primary narrative as frame of a secondary narrative may contribute to 
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making the frame of the novel drop out of focus. This visual parallel may help to 
clarify the point: when we concentrate on a picture in a picture or a film in a film, the 
awareness that what we see in the first place is only a picture or film fades without 
completely vanishing. 
Another intervention of Cnemon illustrates that reflective elements may 
intensify the reader’s absorption: When Calasiris, narrating a footrace in which 
Theagenes competed, describes the scene and lingers on the anxiety with which the 
audience waited for the outcome, Cnemon interrupts him again (4.3.4): ‘It is not 
surprising,’ said Cnemon, ‘that those who were there watching were in agony. Even 
now I fear for Theagenes and beg you to make haste and tell me whether he was 
proclaimed victor.’ When Cnemon begs Calasiris to hurry with his recital, the effect 
on the reader, who is as eager as Cnemon to learn the outcome of the race, is the 
opposite – the interruption retards the story. While the intervention alerts the reader to 
narratorial mediation, the retardation heightens suspense and thereby strengthens the 
immersive appeal of the narrative.  
Besides highlighting the experiential dimension of responses to narrative and 
in addition to illustrating the intricate interplay between the implicit reflection on 
narrative and narrative itself that we also observed in the Odyssey, the Ethiopica 
allow us to make a new point. Reflection and self-reference are at the core of 
poststructuralist readings. As Winkler’s interpretation of the Ethiopica illustrates, 
poststructuralists tend to oppose reflection and immersion: the ‘readerly’ reception of 
Cnemon contrasts with the superior ‘writerly’ mode of Winkler’s ideal reader who 
keeps distance and penetrates Heliodorus’ meta-narrative wit. At first sight, this 
juxtaposition may seem plausible, as meta-narrative highlights narratorial mediation 
and thereby focuses the reader’s attention on the fact that she is not directly 
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witnessing the events. However, Heliodorus’ intricate entanglement of reflection and 
immersion, both at the level of the action and in its interplay with the position of the 
Ethiopica’s reader, underscores that they are not mutually exclusive. The narrative 
maze of the Ethiopica tightly interlaces reflection and immersion. Winkler is as right 
in his emphasis on the novel’s strong meta-narrative dimension as is another scholar 
who claims ‘that virtually everything is geared to one end: intensity of experience for 
the reader’.50 The holy grail of poststructuralism, reflection, has the capacity to foster 
the readerly stance that poststructuralists abhor, that is, immersion.
51
 
My main point concerns narrative, the experiential dimension of which is 
neglected in theory, but this observation on reflection also pertains to the visual arts. 
In a Hegelian mold, Danto claims that, due to an increasing degree of reflectivity, 
aesthetic experience plays no role for modern art: ‘...aesthetical considerations, which 
climaxed in the eighteenth century, have no essential application to what I shall speak 
of as ‘art after the end of art’ – i.e. art produced from the late 1960s on.’52 Danto’s 
thesis has not remained unchallenged. Martin Seel, for one, points out that ‘Danto is 
one-sidedly concerned with the difference between artworks and other things and not 
so much with artworks and other signs.’53 Duchamp’s ready-mades and Warhol’s 
brillo boxes only succeed in exhibiting the paradoxes of artistic appearance through 
appearance; the beholder has to sense and experience them in order to grasp the 
challenge posed to the idea of art. The reflection inherent in modern art thus hinges on 
its experience.  
Let me complement this point by giving an example that combines narrative 
with visual art, namely theatre: Katie Mitchell’s Cologne production of Reise durch 
die Nacht, a stage adaptation of Friederike Mayröcker’s story that was nominated for 
the Berliner Festspiele 2013, is emblematic of the trend of using multiple media in 
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contemporary theater. The stage shows a train with several compartments and, above 
it, a screen on which the images of several cameras on the stage are projected. While 
the actors can be seen through this projection as well as directly, another actress, also 
visible in one of the train compartments, reads the inner monologue of the main 
protagonist, a middle-aged woman, who travels from Paris to Vienna with her 
husband. The production is thus highly reflective; the cameras as well as the 
separation of the visual from the auditive alert the spectator to the mediation: the 
staging does not aim at illusion but highlights its character as representation. 
Nonetheless, the acting on stage, the flux of images and the text read out add up to a 
highly poetic scene. Contrasting with the intimacy of the inner monologue, the medial 
dissection makes the fragmented state of memories tangible. While marking the 
means of mediation, the production cannot fail to pull the audience into the world of 
the play. As this example illustrates, reflection and experience are by no means 
mutually exclusive on the stage. 
 
IV. Between Phenomenology and Historical Semantics 
 
My argument encapsulates a conspicuous tension: I suggest reading ancient 
texts in order to stimulate the current debate on aesthetic theory. This means making 
use of specific historical semantics for conclusions that are not specifically historical. 
Why, to ask more pointedly, should ancient reflections on responses to narrative be 
still valid today? The inverse question is even more trenchant: is it legitimate to 
confront ancient texts with the category of aesthetic experience? The word 
‘aesthetics’ has Greek roots, but it is generally agreed that the discipline was founded 
by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten. It is even controversial whether or not one is 
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entitled to speak of art in antiquity. In an influential article, Paul Oskar Kristeller 
argued that the modern system of the arts was ‘invented’ around 1750 CE. The notion 
of arts in antiquity is therefore a flagrant anachronism: ‘We have to admit the 
conclusion, distasteful to many historians of aesthetics but grudgingly admitted by 
most of them, that ancient writers and thinkers, though confronted with excellent 
works of art and quite susceptible to their charm, were neither able nor eager to 
detach the aesthetic quality of these works of art from their intellectual, moral, 
religious and practical function or content...’54  
Kristeller’s thesis, while often referenced, has been subjected to severe 
criticism. Classicists have been able to show that his assertions about antiquity are 
badly documented and ignore much evidence.
55
 That being said, it is important to 
heed the different setting of art in antiquity. Visual art may be the most glaring case: it 
has been argued that pictures and statues of gods were more than representations and 
made the divinity somehow present.
56
 They were worshipped, washed and dressed as 
if they were the divinities themselves: ‘The representation is not just in the image, the 
represented is the image.’57 The difference between such a ritual mode of viewing and 
our ‘museal’ appreciation of images is too obvious to be argued. A similar point can 
be made for theater: we may watch the same tragedies as Athenians in the 5
th
 century 
BCE; and yet our theaters, whether they are thought to serve the purposes of 
entertainment or to accumulate cultural capital, provide a setting that does not match 
the religious and political frame of the Great Dionysia. To take up one of my sample 
texts: Being alone in a room and reading silently the Odyssey is worlds apart from 
listening to a bard recite the same text in a crowd at a Panhellenic festival. 
At the same time, Jeremy Tanner has shown that ancient and modern notions 
of art are not incomparable.
58
 Particularly the Hellenistic age increasingly created 
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such places as sculpture gardens and picture galleries that favored mainly aesthetic 
modes of viewing.
59
 Despite noting similarities between art in ancient and modern 
thought, Tanner remains sensitive to the remaining gap which he tries to explain in 
sociological and politological terms. I would like to follow here a different path and 
invoke phenomenology as a means of pinpointing the common ground that makes it 
possible and fruitful to envisage aesthetic experience today in light of ancient texts 
without ignoring the crucial differences.
60
 I do not argue that historical semantics are 
built on top of an anthropologically constant ground. In any act of perception both are 
closely entwined with each other.
61
 And yet, it is possible to focus on the 
phenomenological aspect of perception without claiming that it constitutes a separate 
stage. I find this phenomenological aspect in the notion of ‘as-if’. Different as they 
are, ancient and modern aesthetic experiences are aligned by the structure of ‘as-if’. 
Besides varying from medium to medium, this basic ‘as-if’ receives a specific shape 
from its historical and cultural context. This essay is not the place to develop an 
aesthetic theory and set it off from other approaches,
62
 but in order to buttress my 
argument I will briefly sketch the ‘as-if’ of our response to narrative and picture. 
For narrative, I draw on Husserl’s exploration of our consciousness of time.63 
Wondering how various phases can constitute temporal continuum, Husserl explores 
the notion of a sound: it starts, continues and fades, but nonetheless it appears to us as 
a single unit. The key to Husserl’s approach is the idea of retention. Impressions make 
way for new impressions, but instead of simply vanishing, past impressions are 
retained in the modified form of retention which is present with the actual impression 
that is itself about to be transformed into a retention including the retention of its own 
retentions etc.
64
 Perception is thus not a mere point, but contains an 
‘Abschattungsreihe’ in which previous ‘nows’ have sedimented. Distinct from this 
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continuously moving chain of retentions is memory or secondary retention. Memory 
is not the presence of ‘nows’ that have just passed, but the representation of 
something that is not present anymore in the continuum of perception. In contrast to 
the past moment to which our attention is directed, this representation recalls also the 
chain of retentions of that passed moment.
65
  
The goal of explaining the notion of continuum lets Husserl focus on 
retention, primary and secondary, but he also introduces the concept of protention and 
expectation, though much more fleetingly. Protentions correspond to primary 
retentions just as expectations mirror memory. Our impressions have not only a chain 
of retentions retaining the impressions that have just passed, but also come with 
protentions, intentions of the consciousness that are directed to what is to come.
66
 
Likewise, besides recalling past impressions including their array of pro- and 
retentions, the consciousness can also produce images of the future.
67
 Husserl 
introduces the notion of protention only when he discusses ‘Erwartungsintentionen’ in 
memory
68
 and elaborates on expectation only by comparing it with memory,
69
 and yet 
for a systematic analysis of the temporal dynamic of consciousness the orientation to 
the future is as important as the openness to the past. Heidegger, replacing Husserl’s 
focus on perception with his emphasis on ‘Sorge’, would even privilege the future 
dimension in Sein und Zeit. 
Husserl’s explanation of the temporal structure of our perception of the 
everyday world also applies to our reception of narrative. When we follow a story, the 
temporal structure of our consciousness refers to its plot. We have both retentions and 
memories of what has happened in the story and anticipate what is going to happen. 
Note that the temporal dynamics of the reader’s consciousness duplicate the temporal 
dynamics of the characters’ consciousness. The two, however, do not have to be, and 
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most often are not, identical; it is rather the tension between them that defines the 
character of a story.
70
 Central to my argument is that, when we follow a story, our 
retentions and protentions are cast in the frame of ‘as-if’. While focusing on what has 
happened and what is about to happen in the plot, we remain aware of attending only 
to a story.
71
 As much as we may immerse ourselves in the world of a narrative, there 
is a residual awareness of our real environment, sustained for example by our holding 
a book in the hands or our facing a four-dimensional screen. This awareness, 
reflected, as we have seen, in the Ethiopica, is proven by the fact that we, say, do not 
jump up from our seat to flee the approaching murderer. At the same time, the shiver 
we feel attests the focus of our protentions on the development of the plot. 
The ‘as-if’ of narrative is thus temporal: narrative lets us direct primary and 
secondary pro- and retentions to a sequence which we know to be not our everyday 
world. As I have already pointed out, narratives can have a wide range of settings 
which have an impact on the process of reception. The differences between reading 
and listening, between individual and communal experience are considerable. It also 
matters whether we deem the story to be fictional or factual. In all cases, however, the 
temporal dynamics of our consciousness is directed at the sequence of the narrative 
and is bracketed. The various socio-cultural forms of reception are all predicated on 
the common fundament of an experience in the realm of ‘as-if’. 
A similar case can be made, mutatis mutandis, for pictures. Richard Neer has 
recently reconsidered Vernant’s thesis that in ancient Greece the concept of image did 
not emerge until the Classical period.
72
 At least some of Vernant’s articles seem to 
imply not only the observation that Archaic Greeks lacked a concept of image – they 
used the same word, sēma, for images and symbols – but also the claim that they did 
not experience pictorial representation as different from such symbolic operators as 
Copyright ©2015 Johns Hopkins University Press. This article appeared first in New Literay History 46/2 Spring 2015, 309-333
 24 
bird omens. While acknowledging the insights of Vernant’s discussion, Neer refutes 
this thesis by arguing that the evidence still visible to us, that is our own experience of 
Archaic images, tells us more about the experience of Archaic Greeks than how they 
verbally referred to their images: ‘phenomenology grounds philology.’73 The 
decipherment of Linear B, the writing system used by Greeks during the Bronze Age, 
is a compelling illustration of this thesis:
74
 Puzzling over the remaining texts, mostly 
lists, the architect Michael Ventris assigned sound-values to the signs. His 
decipherment, however, was only confirmed when archaeologists unearthed a text 
that juxtaposed signs with pictures: a clay tablet from Pylos that features pictures of 
tripods and flagons, followed by a mark signifying the number and Linear B 
characters that, in Ventris’ system, read as ‘ti-ri-po-de’, that is tripods: ‘The 
comprehensibility of the figural representation had analytical priority over the 
comprehensibility of the writing system, such that the figural representations verified 
the decipherment of the script (as opposed to the other way around). We assume the 
figural representations to be comprehensible prior to the script; indeed, the 
comprehensibility of the figures grounds that of the script.’75 Of course, an anecdote 
from the 20
th
 century CE cannot, strictly speaking, prove perceptual habits in the 7
th
 
century BCE. And yet, it is hard to believe that Archaic Greeks, having the Pylian 
tablet in front of them, would have failed to recognize the tripods just as they were 
unable to read the Linear B text. 
The notion of ‘seeing-in’, coined by Wollheim, can show that our seeing of 
pictures is phenomenologically grounded in an ‘as-if’. Wollheim argues that pictures 
require a special mode of seeing, a concept which he spells out in a critique of 
Gombrich’s illusion theory.76 Gombrich adduces the well-known drawing that can be 
seen either as a duck or as a rabbit as evidence for his thesis that we see either the 
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canvas or the object represented, but never both simultaneously. The example of the 
duck-rabbit, however, made famous by its discussion in Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophische Untersuchungen, has no bearing on the dichotomy of canvas and 
object of representation. The choice between rabbit and duck is mutually exclusive 
indeed: one can see only either, but it is a choice between two different objects of 
representation, not between representing object and represented object. In his 
‘twofold thesis’, Wollheim argues that it is not only possible, but necessary to attend 
simultaneously to the object of a representation and its material features.
77
 Seeing 
pictures is based on ‘a special perceptual capacity, which presupposes, but is 
something over and above, straightforward perception.’78 Wollheim labels this special 
mode of perception ‘seeing-in’: When we see an object in a picture, we are aware of 
the canvas as well as the represented object. Initially, Wollheim introduced seeing 
represented object and seeing representing object as two experiences. Later, he treated 
them as ‘two aspects of a single experience that I have’.79 ‘Discerning something in 
the marked surface’, on the one hand, is the ‘recognitional aspect’; ‘our awareness of 
the marked surface itself’, on the other, is the ‘configurational aspect’.80  
Most of the detailed arguments with which Wollheim put forward his concept 
were successfully challenged,
81
 and yet the points raised did not chip away from the 
overall plausibility of ‘seeing-in’. The perhaps most incisive critique of the concept of 
‘seeing-in’ is that it has little explanatory power: Wollheim does not clarify, indeed he 
deems it impossible to clarify, how we actually see an object in a picture.
82
 What 
exactly is it that allows us to see more than lines and dots? This lacuna may 
undermine Wollheim’s claim to furnish a full-blown theory of pictorial 
representation; it does not, though, reduce the value of ‘seeing-in’ for my argument. 
‘Twofoldedness’ grasps the ‘as-if’ in seeing pictures that is pivotal to it. On the one 
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hand, we see the object represented; on the other, the attention to the representing 
object alerts us to the fact that the represented object we see is not ‘real’. The ‘as-if’, 
temporal for narrative, is spatial in the case of pictorial representation. We see an 
object in front of us and simultaneously see that it is not there. Our vision of the 
represented object, just as the chain of pro- and retentions in the reception of 
narrative, is bracketed by ‘as-if’. 
I have already mentioned the ritual mode of viewing in antiquity that deviates 
significantly from the disinterested appreciation of art so popular in modern 
aesthetics. It would be easy to list yet other concepts of gaze. Arguing ‘that the 
‘aesthetic attitude’ is a specific historical product of the religious crisis of the 
Enlightenment and the rise of Western science, and that it has no applicability to 
civilizations which have not internalized the Enlightenment as we have’,83 Gell 
discusses for example Indian pictures:
84
 in Hinduism images are the object not so 
much of aesthetic response as of worship. As Gell describes it, there is a reciprocal 
relation between the beholder and the deity represented. The eyes of the worshipper, 
Indian philosophers believe, reach out to the picture and touch its object. The eyes of 
the deity inversely bestow ‘darshan’ on the beholder. ‘Darshan’ is a ‘particular type of 
blessing conveyed through the eyes’;85 it emanates from pictures as well as from real 
persons.  
The salient differences notwithstanding, all these modes of viewing pictures 
involve ‘seeing-in’. There is no doubt that the Hindu receiving ‘darshan’ from the 
exchange of gazes with a representation of Shiva engages in a different activity from 
the European who looks at the same picture in an art exhibition. But while interacting 
with the deity in the picture, the beholder has to ‘see’ the divinity ‘in’ the picture. She 
has to recognize that she is not looking at a mere piece of wood, but at a pictorial 
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representation. The wood does not feature a random selection of color dots, including 
two symmetrical dark circles with white circles around them; it represents the eyes of 
a divinity from which the blessing emanates. The reverential gaze is predicated on the 
same process of ‘seeing-in’ as that of a European art connoisseur comparing the eyes 
of Shiva with the calculating eyes of a merchant portrayed by Jan van Eyck.  
This sketch of the ‘as-if’ in narrative and picture, cursory as it is,86 lets us see 
the modern concept of aesthetic experience in a new light. The idea of disinterested 
reception – if it can be maintained at all –87 is not as peculiar as anthropologists like 
Gell assume. It is distinct in reinforcing the phenomenological ‘as-if’, which, 
however, it shares with other cultural modes of perception. In addition to bracketing 
the perceptual experience, the modern aesthetic attitude further extracts the object of 
its attention from pragmatic constraints. Take the case of pictures: In an essay on 
‘homo 27ictor’, Hans Jonas elaborates on the distance that separates pictorial 
representation from real things: ‘It (i.e. the similarity of pictorial representation) can 
represent the dangerous without being dangerous, the harmful without harming, the 
desired without satiating. What is represented in the picture is extricated from the 
causal traffic of things and converted into a non-dynamic form of existence...’88 In the 
modern conception of aesthetic experience, not only the represented object, but the 
picture itself is removed from the causal traffic of things – this is manifest in the 
institution of the museum. As Gadamer points out, the museum is one of the places 
that cater to the ‘aesthetic distinction’: in depriving pictures and other artistic works 
of a specific context and occasional character, the museum invites a disinterested 
stance.
89
 It is important however to see that the idea of disinterested perception and its 
spatial realization in the museum, while being specific to the modern period, builds on 
the ‘as-if’ of aesthetic experience that is phenomenologically grounded. Inversely, 
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other cultures entwine art with religious and political aspects, and yet the response to 
it, while different from the detached attitude of the connoisseur, is predicated on an 
experiential ‘as-if’. 
The phenomenological aspect of aesthetic experience makes it possible to 
engage ancient reflections in a dialogue with the current debate in art theory. 
Aesthetic experience, ancient testimonies suggest, is not only epistemic, as analytical 
philosophers tend to argue. Even narrative, a medium that is still associated mainly 
with the linguistic turn, has the capacity to provoke strong psychological and physical 
reactions. Counter to the assumptions of poststructuralism and analytical philosophy, 
ancient meta-narrative drives home that experience and reflection do not have to be 
mutually exclusive. While heeding specific historical semantics, the dialogue I 
propose goes beyond a historicist investigation. The emphasis on the significance of 
ancient positions for current debates also renders it different from studies in reception 
and ‘Nachleben’. At the same time, my approach does not imply a return to the 
Classicist fallacy that celebrates antiquity as the ideal model. It is rather premised on 
the friction between phenomenology and historical semantics which makes it 
worthwhile to see in ancient texts more than sources for the study of antiquity. 
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